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U.S.-NIGERIA RELATIONS IN 
IDSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Elizabeth L. Normandy , The University of North Carolina at 
Pembroke 
Introduction 
United States' relations with Nigeria have alternated between 
periods of close or special relations and periods of indifference, neglect, 
and hostility. Major developments in the relationship include a period of 
cordial relations from 1960 to 1966, strained relations from the first 
Nigerian coup through the civil war 1966-1970, and a growing 
rapprochement from 1970 to 1979 due to mutual economic interests and 
the election of Jimmy Carter . The policies of the Reagan administration 
caused strains in the relationship. The Nigerian civil war and Angolan 
independence were events which led to low points in the relationship . In 
the post-Cold War period, U.S.-Nigeria relations have reached a new low 
point due to the changed priorities of U.S . foreign policy, the continuing 
turmoil in Nigeria's political system, and the deteriorating state of 
Nigeria's economy. Because U.S. policy towards Nigeria is an outgrowth 
of U.S. policy on Africa in general and because Nigeria's actions towards 
the U.S. are related to Nigeria's overall foreign policy goals, the 
discussi on ofU. S. -Nigeria relations in each of the time periods considered 
is preceded by a brieflook at the predominant features ofNigerian foreign 
policy and U.S. Africa policy. 
The "Era of Good Feeling," 1960-1966 
At independence, it was assumed that Nigeria, because ifits size, 
resources, and location, would play an important role in African politics 
and world affairs . Nigeria ' s leaders espoused a commitment to 
nonintervention in the internal affairs of other African countries, a 
preference for a gradual, functional approach to African unity based on 
economic co-operation, and an emphasis on gradual and non-violent 
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progress towards African independence . 1 However, the centerpiece of 
Nigeria ' s foreign policy was the commitment to a policy of 
nonalignment. At the same time, Nigeria would continue to have close 
economic and other ties to the West, owing to the need for capital and 
trained manpower to support Nigeria ' s economic development.2 Trade 
with other African countries was insignificant and ties to the Communist 
countries were practically nonexistent. 3 In African affairs , Nigeria 
played a moderate role, supporting UN efforts in the Congo crisis and 
taking a leadership role in the formation of the Organization of African 
Unity.4 
U.S. policy on Africa under the Eisenhower administration 
combined rhetorical support for African independence with the 
subordination of decolonization to the needs of anti-Communism . s As 
the colonial powers signaled their intention to grant independence in the 
late 1950s, the U.S. modified its policy to reflect a more pro-Africa 
stance, but it did not become actively involved 'in events in Africa . In 
1957, Vice President Richard Nixon represented the U.S. at Ghana ' s 
independence celebration and, in 1958; the Department of State created 
a separate Bureau of African Affairs. Although strong ties to the West 
would be encouraged , the U.S. would continue to subordinate its policy 
to European concerns. 6 
Under Kennedy , the U.S. emphasized integrating newly-
independent and nonaligned African states into the non-Communist 
world largely through the use of economic aid. Additionally , the U.S. 
supported African aspirations regarding sovereignty and an independent 
foreign policy and did not eng!lge in coercive diplomacy.7 With the 
exception of the Congo, where the U.S. worked to prevent Soviet 
involvement, there seemed to be no area of Africa under serious threat of 
Communist infiltration. There were very few specific African issues of 
interest to the U.S., and it was content to allow the European powers take 
the lead in most areas of the continent. 8 
U.S.-Nigeria relations in the period from independence to the 
first military coup were exceptionally friendly.9 Nigeria ' s attractiveness 
to the U.S. was based on its size, particularly its large population , which 
indicated that Nigeria was destined to play a leadership role in Africa . 
Nigeria, on the other hand , recognized the importance of the U.S. to 
Nigeria's political and economic development. Soon after independence , 
Nigeria was admitted to the U.N., and Nigeria chose the U.S. to perform 
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the symbolically significant role of recommending its membership to the 
General Assembly. Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, Nigeria's first prime 
minister, met with Kennedy during an official visit to the U.S. in July 
1961 and addressed a joint session of Congress. 
In the Congo crisis of the 1960s, the interests ofNigeria and the 
U.S. coincided. Both countries supported United Nations efforts to 
preserve peace, stability, and unity in the Congo. The U.S. and Nigeria 
also sought to develop strong economic ties during this early period. The 
U.S. wished to expand trade and encourage investment. Nigeria was 
hoping to benefit from American economic and technical aid programs. 
In the American view, Nigeria was to be the model for other 
African countries to follow. Reinforced by the nature of its foreign aid, 
Nigeria's essentially cautious and conservative foreign policy continued 
to favor the West. When ethnic conflict erupted, the U.S. hoped that 
economic development would be the antidote to Nigeria's political 
instability and would keep Nigeria from succumbing to radical and 
Communist influences. 
The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 
Since independence, the major problem which had plagued 
Nigeria's leaders had been to maintain Nigeria ' s unity in the face of the 
disintegrative forces set in motion by Nigeria's multi-ethnic composition. 
In early 1966, a group of army majors engineered a military take-over 
which brought Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi to power. Following the July 
1966 counter-coup, Lieutenant Colonel Y akubu Gowan assumed the 
leadership of the military government. The Governor of the Eastern 
Region, Lieutenant Colonel Odemegwu Ojukwu, refused to recognize 
Gowon's authority and declared Biafra an independent state on May 30, 
1967.10 
Nigeria's primary goal was to limit the international assistance 
Biafra received. It tried to convince African governments that it could 
end the secession quickly and to show the West that it was capable of 
deliberation and restraint. The OAU supported Nigerian reunification, 
and Nigeria used this and the support of other members of the 
international community to prevent further recognition or backing of 
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Biafra. Biafra campaigned to involve the world in what was portrayed as 
a struggle against genocide . The goal was to mobilize international 
pressure to get Nigeria to accept an unconditional cease-fire . Although 
four African governments recognized Biafra, Biafra did not succeed in 
provoking greater international recognition or in persuading Nigeria to 
agree to a cease-fire. Recognition by other African governments was not 
forthcoming . When Biafra became the focus of an international relief 
operation, it was able to prolong the war. Although Biafra tried to make 
its viability and self-reliance the centerpiece of its foreign policy, it was 
defeated militarily and was forced to surrender on January 15, 1970.11 
Lyndon Johnson did not have John Kennedy ' s interest in Africa. 
His policies did not differ markedly from those of his predecessors and 
African issues did not have a high priority as the administration's time 
and attention were taken up more crucial issues such as Vietnam. Aid to 
Africa was scaled back . 12 
American optimism over Nigeria ' s future as a unified country 
playing a leadership role in Africa was shattered by the January 1966 
coup. The U.S. hoped the military government could keep Nigeria united. 
Although Nigeria wanted to buy arms from the U.S., the U.S. declared an 
arms embargo on both sides on July 10th, 1967. Nigeria accused the U.S. 
of supporting Biafra . The relationship between the two co~tries was 
strained. The U.S. later modified its neutral policy somewhat by 
authorizing funds for relief, but the U.S. role in the relief effort further 
strained its relationship with Nigeria. 13 
The election of Richard Nixon in November 1968 buoyed the 
hopes of the Biafrans that a change of U.S. policy might occur. Although 
policy makers explored the option of recognizing Biafra, Nixon and 
Kissinger decided to expand the relief program instead. The Nigerians 
were concerned that any shift in U.S. policy would involve the U.S. in 
political questions. The Biafrans were hoping that Nixon would support 
a cease-fire. The Nigerians were relieved, therefore, when Nixon 
announced that there would be no majornew U.S. involvement. After the 
surrender, President Nixon offered Gowon an additional $10 million for 
relief .14 
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Rapprochement and Confrontation, 1970-1976 
One of Nigeria's first initiatives in the aftennath of the civil war 
was to take steps to develop ECOWAS, the Economic Community of 
West African States. Nigeria also sought to play a greater role in African 
affairs. It reconciled with the four states that recognized Biafra and tried 
to have a greater role in the OAU. 15 
In the years following the civil war, Nigeria became more 
strongly committed to eliminating colonialism and racism. Nigeria 
advocated an increase in member contributions to the OAU liberation 
committee and provided direct bilateral assistance to freedom fighters . In 
relations with countries outside Africa, Nigeria played a prominent role 
in negotiations with the EEC, clashed with the British government over 
its policies towards white-minority ruled regimes in Southern Africa, and 
improved its relations with France. In an effort to strengthen its 
nonaligned status, Nigeria sought to maintain and expand ties with the 
Soviet Union and to increase economic ties with other Communist 
countries. 16 
During the 1970-1976 period, Nigeria's ability to exert influence 
in African affairs was strengthened by its oil boom. As a result of this 
development, Nigeria's trading patterns shifted somewhat. While Britain 
remained Nigeria's major trading partner, the U.S. became a major 
foreign market for oil and Nigeria's main source of foreign exchange. 17 
In July 1975, a coup in Nigeria ended the regime of Yakubu 
Gowon and brought to power Brigadier General Murtala Muhammed. 
The style of Nigeria's foreign policy became more militant, radical, and 
nationalistic. More emphasis was placed on the struggle against 
colonialism, racism, and apartheid, and relations with neighbors were 
initially downplayed. This approach led Nigeria into intense conflict 
with the U.S. over Angola . In power only a few months, Muhammed 
was assassinated in an abortive coup attempt, and Lieutenant General 
Olusegun Obasanjo took over as head of the Nigerian government. 
Initially, the Obasanjo government retained the same radical and dynamic 
style and continued to confront the U.S. on Southern African issues. 18 
Initially, the Nixon administration viewed Africa as a minor area 
of interest. The Nixon Qoctrine, based on the need for a certain amount 
of U.S . retrenchment, called for Africa to be an area in which the U.S. 
would not have to intervene. The U.S. adopted Option 2 of National 
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Security Study Memorandum 39 which called for greater communication 
with South Africa in order to bring about a liberalization of its racial 
policies. The U.S. showed little interest in other areas, expending few 
resources, showing indifference towards Rhodesian sanctions , and 
supporting arms sales to Portugal. Following the Portuguese coup of 
1974 and the impending take-over of the Angolan government by the 
Marxist MPLA, the U.S. decided to support opposition forces . However , 
the U.S. Congress cut off further military aid for Angola in December 
1975, forcing the administration to look for other means oflimiting Soviet 
influence in Africa. In July 1976, Henry Kissinger announced a change 
in U.S. policy in which the U.S . would support majority rule in Southern 
Africa, promote Namibian independence , and involve South Africa in 
negotiations over Namibia and Rhodesia. 19 
Until the Portuguese coup , U.S.-Nigeria relations were 
characterized by increasing economic interaction but considerable 
political indifference . Oil became the major focus of the relationship . As 
U.S. dependence on Nigerian oil increased , Nigeria considered whether 
or not to use its newfound wealth and power to try to bring about changes 
in U .S. policy on Southern Africa. Through 1973, the U.S. did its best 
not to deal with Nigeria on political questions , especiall y those 
concerning Southern Africa . 20 
Following the Portuguese coup and the U.S. decision to back 
anti-MPLA forces in Angola in 1975, relations between Nigeria and the 
U.S. reached a low point. Nigerian troops forcibly occupied the USIS 
office in Lagos . In October 1975, Nigeria backed the MPLA with $20 
million in aid and lobbied other African states to recognize the MPLA 
government. 21 Nigeria viewed U.S. policy on Angola as racist and neo-
colonial and charged the U.S. with collaboration with South Africa on the 
Angolan issue . The situation · did not improve when, in January 1976, 
Gerald Ford sent a message to African heads of state at a meeting of the 
OAU offering to have South African troops removed from Angola in 
exchange for the withdrawal of Cuban troops. Nigeria quickly 
condemned the letter and attacked the U.S. at the OAU summit. 
Although the U.S. tried to repair relations with Nigeria , the 
situation was still one of hostility when Olusegun Obasanjo took over as 
head of the Nigerian government. Three requests by Henry Kissinger to 
visit Nigeria were refused. In October 1976, Nigeria rejected British and 
American proposals for Rhodesia . Despite its hard line stance , Nigeria 
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had not been able to affect the course of U.S. policy. 22 
Obasanjo and Carter, 1976-1980 
Under Obasanjo's leadership, regional cooperation was restored 
to a high priority in Nigerian foreign policy . While Nigeria's support for 
freedom fighters in Southern Africa remained strong, it moved towards 
occupying the role of peacekeeper or mediator in African conflicts. 
Relations with Britain were put on a more positive footing, with Nigeria 
endorsing the Anglo-American peace plan for Rhodesia. Economic ties 
with the West remained strong . In 1978, the U .S. bought 60% of 
Nigeria's oil and provided Nigeria with 54% of its financial resources . 
Nigeria continued to receive technical assistance from the West, and 
economic relationships with Communist countries did not expand . As 
Nigeria prepared for elections in 1979 to return the country to civilian 
rule, it appeared that a major constraint on the further development of 
Nigeria ' s foreign policy was the need to concentrate on domestic 
problems. Shehu Shargari was elected president of Nigeria's Second 
Republic in October 1979.23 
President Carter took more of an interest in African than any 
president since John F. Kennedy . The U.S . commited itself to support 
for majority rule, to the promotion of human rights, and to contributing to 
economic development in order to achieve its goals in Africa. It did not 
cast African issues in a Cold War context . While the U.S . criticized 
South Africa and distanced itself from South Africa, it did not enact 
sanctions against it because the U.S. needed South Africa's help to solve 
the crises in Rhodesia and Namibia.i 4• 
Early in the administration, officials tried to distance the U.S. 
from the Mobutu regime in Zaire and declined to involve the U.S. 
militarily in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. The U.S. rejected 
an internal settlement negotiated by Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith 
which would not have resulted in genuine majority rule and participated 
in the development of an Anglo-American peace plan. On Namibia, the 
U.S. worked with a group of nations known as the Western Contact 
Group to bring about a peaceful solution. 25 
In the latter part of the Carter adm·inistration, U.S. policy on 
Africa changed to one that more closely resembled that of previous 
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administrations, emphasizing containment of Soviet expansion through 
military means. The shift was brought about by a series of events 
including the seizure of American hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, and by the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola 
and Ethiopia. A second invasion of Zaire in mid-1978 brought a forceful 
response from the U.S. in support of the Mobutu regime. Relations with 
South Africa were marked more by cooperation than pressure. The U.S. 
concluded an agreement with Somalia for the use of military facilities in 
exchange for economic and security assistance . In general, African issues 
lost the primacy that they had in the early years of the Carter 
administration. 26 
In the changed atmosphere of U.S. policy towards Africa in the 
first part of the Carter administration, U.S .-Nigeria relations flourished. 
The U.S. viewed Nigeria as a key player in its Africa policy. On a visit 
to Nigeria in February 1977, Andrew Young established close ties with 
Nigeria's leaders. Nigeria decided to back the Anglo-American plan for 
peace in Rhodesia in September 1977.27 In October 1977, Obasanjo 
visited the U.S., the first Nigerian head of state to meet with a U.S. 
president since Balewa met with Kennedy in 1961. Following a visit to 
Nigeria in 1978, Carter continued to reject an internal settlement in 
Rhodesia, and Obasanjo tried to try to get African countries to support the 
Anglo-American plan.28 
Upon the return of a Cold War orientation in U .S. policy, 
relations between the U.S. and Nigeria cooled. Nigeria was .frustrated 
ove.r the inability of the U.S. to produce concrete results in the movement 
towards majority rule in Southern Africa . After 1978, Nigeria 
concentrated on the impending return to civilian rule. Economic ties 
remained strong. Bilateral talks about agricultural, education , economic 
development, and technical assistance resulted in a cooperative 
agreement on agriculture. The U.S. became a major supplier of food to 
Nigeria in the late l 970s. Nigeria continued to reap tremendous profits 
from the rising price ofoil until 1981, and U.S. dependence on Nigerian 
oil increased. Despite its wealth from oil, Nigeria found it necessary to 
resort to extensive foreign borrowing in order to finance its development 
plans.29 
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The Reagan Years, 1981-1988 
During the regime of Shehu Shagari, Nigeria faced a 
deteriorating economic and political situation. The oil boom ended in 
198 l as oil prices began to drop. Government spending, foreign debt, and 
corruption increased. Although the government instituted austerity 
measures, it decided not to accept loans from the IMF for fear of the 
political consequences of IMF conditions. On the political scene, the 
government had to contend with disturbances among the Muslim 
population in the North, student protests, and a teachers' strike.30 
Nigeria's ability to play a leadership role in Africa declined 
under the weight of its economic and political problems. Shagari' s policy 
was considerably more ambiguous and uncertain than Obasanjo' s, and his 
style was more cautious. The goals of Nigeria's foreign policy, as stated 
in the 1979 constitution, were the promotion of African unity, liberation 
of Africa, and elimination of racial discrimination. Border clashes with 
Benin, Chad, and Cameroon were resolved through negotiation. A 
Nigeria-led multinational African force in Chad failed to secure Libyan 
withdrawal, demonstrating Nigeria's weakness and undermining the 
Shagari government. In a crackdown on illegal immigration motivated by 
deteriorating domestic conditions, Nigeria expelled more than two million 
foreign workers . 31 
Corruption and economic chaos led the military to take over 
once again in December 1983. The regime of Major General Muhammad 
Buhari tried to reduce corruption and restore the economy. A series of 
austerity measures were adopted, but negotiation with the IMF for new 
loans failed. The regime dealt harshly with criticism, jailing journalists, 
politicians, and other dissenters. Foreign policy activity was minimal. In 
1984, Nigeria closed all of its borders for a time in order to control 
currency trafficking and smuggling, and there was another mass 
deportation of illegal aliens in 1985 :32 
In August 1985, Buhari was deposed in a bloodless coup and 
was replaced by Major General Ibrahim Babangida. The new regime 
committed itself to the return of civilian rule and began to release 
journalists, dissidents, and political prisoners. In dealing with Nigeria's 
pressing economic problems, Babangida rejected the option of an IMF 
loan, and formulated his own austerity program. 33 
Nigeria's ability to exercise influence internationally was 
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hampered by the weakness of its economy and its political instability . 
Although relations with African states continued to be the cornerstone of 
foreign policy, economic diplomacy involving trade, foreign investment, 
and debt rescheduling had a high priority on the agenda. 34 Outside of the 
region, Nigeria contributed $20 million to assist SWAPO in the 1989 
elections in Namibia and provided forces to the UN operations to monitor 
the Iran-Iraq cease-fire and the Angola-Namibia Accords .. Relations with 
France improved due to expanding economic ties and common opposition 
to Libya's involvement in Chad. Despite the British government's 
opposition to sanctions against South Africa, relations between Nigeria 
and Britain improved . 35 
Under Reagan, U.S . foreign policy returned to a Cold War 
orientation emphasizing containment of the Soviet Union. In this 
environment, Africa was not important to the U.S .. The major focus of 
U.S. Africa policy was Southern Africa where pressure on South Africa 
was considered counter-productive. The .U.S. hoped that the policy 
known as "constructive engagement" would bring not only internal reform 
in South Africa but secure its help in resolving regional problems. U.S. 
goals included securing independence for Namibia, the withdrawal of 
Cuban troops from Angola, and the removal of the Marxist government 
in Angola . To obtain the latter, the U.S. supported Jonas Savimbi and the 
rival UNIT A faction in Angola. The U.S . vetoed UN resolutions calling 
for sanctions against South Africa. South African incursions into Angola 
and guerrilla attacks in Mozambique were met with only mild criticism . 
Nonetheless, U.S. negotiators failed to achieve a comprehensive 
settlement of Southern African problems by the end of Reagan's firstterm 
in 1984. 
Elsewhere in Africa, Cold War considerations prevailed . The 
U.S. supported the Mobutu regime in Zaire because of its value as an anti-
Communist ally. Fears of Soviet gains in the Horn of Africa prompted 
offers of military aid to Somalia. In Reagan's second term, Chester 
Crocker achieved agreement among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa on 
Namibia. Despite a presidential veto, the U.S. Congress imposed 
sanctions on South Africa. Congress also repealed the Clark Amendment 
which banned assistance to Angolan guerrillas, and covert aid began to 
flow to Jonas Savimbi's forces. 36 
Nigeria's relations with the U.S. did not flourish in this Cold 
War environment. The U.S . did not consider relations with Nigeria to be 
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a high priority, and Nigeria, beset by economic and political problems, 
had little ability to command U.S . attention. The U.S. saw no role for 
Nigeria in Southern Africa . Although Nigeria was highly critical of U.S . 
policy there, its efforts to get the U.S. to change its position were 
unsuccess ful. In 1982, Nigeria refused to support the removal of all 
foreign troops from Southern Africa and called on the U.S. to implement 
sanctions against South Africa. Nigeria opposed dialogue with South 
Africa and the loosening of the arms embargo . Nigeria was unable to 
change the U.S. position on Namibia or to prevent its support of 
UNITA. 37 
In economic matters , Nigeria's importance to the U.S. also 
declined . Nigeria's need for loans and debt rescheduling increased its 
dependence on the U.S. Nigerians suspected that the U .S. was 
responsib le for the stringent conditions attached to potential IMF loans . 38 
The Post-Cold War Period 
Elections to return Nigeria to civilian rule took place in June 
1993, but were later annulled by the Babangida regime . In November 
1993, General Sani Abacha seized power . One of a series of summary 
trials in the fall of 1995 led to the conviction and subsequent execution of 
nine Ogoni minority rights activists, including author Ken Saro-Wiwa .39 
The government announced a three-year timetable to complete the 
transition to civilian rule. However, human rights abuses, including 
arbitrary detention, restrictions on freedom of expression and association, 
and the use of military tribunals continue unabated. In 1997, Nobel Prize 
winner, Wole Soyinka , and more than a dozen leaders of the National 
Democratic Coalition ofNigeria (NADECO) were charged with treason . 
Nigeria's economic picture has not improved . Through 1992 the 
budget deficit increased , and external debt continued to grow until 1993. 
Although Abacha initially abandoned Babangida's economic reform 
program and emphasized state control, in 1995, he announced a series of 
reforms designed to attract investors and facilitate debt rescheduling . 
With a GNP per capita ofless than $300, Nigeria is considered one of the 
world's poores t countries. 40 
Despite its political an'd economic problems, Nigeria continues 
to be a force in the region . Beginning in 1990, Nigeria contributed the 
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bulk of the forces to the ECOW AS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) in Liberia. Nigeria also sent troops to Sierra Leone to try to 
restore the democratically-elected government. Other regional issues 
involve long-standing border disputes with Cameroon over the Bakassi 
Islands and with Chad over islands in Lake Chad . Outside of the region, 
Nigeria contributed troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda , 
Yugoslavia , and Somalia.41 
In the wake of the 1993 election annulment , relations with 
Western powers have been strained . However, no industrialized country 
has been willing to embargo Nigerian oil in order to force changes in 
Nigeria's political system. Despite the emergence of South Africa as the 
next probable African leader and role model, Nigeria still aspires to 
exercise a leadership role in Africa and in the world as evidenced in its 
continuing quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 42 
U.S. policy on Africa in the post-Cold War era has reflected a 
concern for promoting democracy and human rights , for encouraging 
economic reform in African countries , and for the resolution of conflicts . 
When the Soviets withdrew from Africa at the end of the Cold War, U.S. 
strategic interests in Africa receded , and U.S. assistance decreased. 
Observers pondered such questions as whether or not the U.S. would now 
decrease its support for dictatorial regimes and whether or not U.S. aid 
should be used to press for political and economic reform.43 
The Bush administration came into office pledging to follow 
Reagan ' s policies. It condemned the statist model of economic policy 
.followed by African countries and reaffirmed U.S. support for free market 
economics . It insisted that it would promote peaceful change in southern 
Africa but would not support further sanctions against South Africa or 
withdraw support from Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. By 1992, the Bush 
administration could claim to have participated in conflict resolution in 
Angola, Namibia , Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Liberia. Thirty million 
dollars had been allocated for electoral assistance and to promote civil 
and political rights : More than one billion dollars in official debt to the 
U.S. had been forgiven for the poorest African countries committed to 
economic reform. On the basis of South Africa's progress in dismantling 
apartheid , the U.S. repealed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. As 
the Bush administration prepared to leave office, U.S. troops were sent to 
Somalia on a humanitarian mission.44 
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As the Bush administration had done, the Clinton administration 
took office condemning the statist policies of African governments , 
corruption, and one-party rule. It pledged that U.S. aid would be used to 
assist democracies and free market economies and not dictatorial regimes. 
In 1993, the U.S. recognized Angola . Sam Nujoma ofNamibia was the 
first African head of state to visit the Clinton White House. Recognition 
was extended to Eritrea following elections in 1993. $1 billion was 
contributed to drought relief in Southern Africa .45 
American troops were withdrawn from Somalia in 1994 
following the deaths of U.S. soldiers, and, in the wake of the Somali 
debacle, U.S. involvement in the Rwanda crisis was limited. Although the 
U.S. encouraged Mobutu of Zaire to negotiate with the opposition , it did 
not call upon him to step down, nor did it take stronger measures against 
his regime. The U.S. continued its support of the ECOWAS effort in 
Liberia.46 
In response to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni 
activists in 1995, the U.S. instituted modest sanctions against Nigeria . It 
halted direct air travel from the U.S. to Nigeria, suspended foreign aid, 
and banned the sale of military equipment. U.S. support for World Bank 
and IMF assistance was withdrawn, and Nigerian officials were banned 
from traveling to the U.S.47 In 1997, the U.S. undertook a comprehensive 
review ofits policy towards Nigeria , but the options for changing the U.S . 
position are limited. There is no support for an oil embargo, and any 
attempt to improve cooperation seems likely to draw opposition from 
human rights groups, members of Congress, and Trans-Africa, the 
African-American pressure group .48 In 1997, members of Congress 
introduced a resolution condemning Nigeria ' s behavior towards the U.S. 
Ambassador and proposed legislation to implement strong economic 
sanctions against Nigeria. A movement among local government in the 
U.S. to pass pro-democracy resolutions and impose sanctions against 
Nigeria grew. In September 1997, Alameda County, California passed a 
binding selective purchase/divestment resolution which, it is estimated, 
will cost corporations doing business in or with Nigeria $200 million.49 
Nigeria has lobbied for a reversal of U.S. policy. Its efforts to 
blame U.S. Ambassador Walter Carrington for the hostile American 
attitude were apparently a factor in his recall in August 1997. A farewell 
party for Carrington organized by human rights and pro-democracy 
groups was disrupted by Nigerian police causing the U.S . to lodge an 
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official protest with the Nigerian government. Despite the troubled 
diplomatic relationship, economic ties have flourished . The U.S. is still 
the largest buyer of Nigerian oil, accounting for 40% of Nigeria ' s oil 
sales . In September 1997, Nigeria began exporting liquefied petroleum 
gas to the U.S. According to William H. Twaddell , the U.S. ambassador-
designee, Nigeria is America's most significant trade and investment 
partner in Africa . The imposition of tough economic sanctions are seen 
as damaging to U.S. interests in Nigeria .50 
Conclusion 
The relationship between the U.S. and Nigeria in the post-Cold 
war period differs in some significant ways from that which preceded it. 
The alternations that can be seen in U.S.-Nigeria relations during the Cold 
War can be ascribed to two equally i.mportapt factors. First, U.S.-
Nigerian relations were obviously affected by the degree to which U.S. 
policy on Africa operated from a Cold War framework. Relations 
between the two countries improved when Cold War issues were not the 
primary focus ofU.S. policy on Africa , and they deteriorated when issues 
of concern to Nigeria were subordinated to the U.S. preoccupation with 
Soviet designs . This explains the relatively good relations during the 
Kennedy and Carter years. It is also the reason the U.S.-Nigeria relations 
reached such a low point over the issue of Angola during the Nixon 
administration . 
Second, U.S.-Nigerian relations were affected by Nigeria's 
domestic economic and political situation . Political instability diverted 
Nigeria ' s attention away from foreign policy,jeopardized Nigeria ' s claim 
to leadership status, and caused the U.S. to distance itself from Nigeria. 
When Nigeria ' s leaders were preoccupied with holding the country 
together during the civil war, or trying to manage a transition from 
military to civilian rule, or trying to combat corruption , or preoccupied 
with silencing government critics during ti.mes of rapid regime change, 
their attention to foreign affairs was often diminished . Nigeria's 
economy, on the other hand, was ll source of strength in the relationship . 
The economic ties between the U.S. and Nigeria seemed to endure and 
flourish whatever the nature of their political relationship . This explains 
why the highest point in the relationship occurred in the late 1970s when, 
50 I The Journal of Political Science 
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because of oil, the U .S. looked upon Nigeria as an African power . Also 
at that time, Cold War considerations were temporarily on the back 
burner. The deterioration of the economy in the Reagan years, coinciding 
with the return to a Cold War approach to Africa, contributed to the poor 
state of the relationship during the 1980s. 
In the post-Cold War period , U.S . -Nigeria relations have reached 
a new low since the advent of the Abacha regime . The end of the Cold 
War was a mixed blessing for Nigeria . No longer do Cold War 
considerations dominate the relationship with the U.S., but, in the post-
Cold War environment, U.S. interest in Africa has diminished and 
concern for democratization and economic reform has replaced Cold War 
issues . Now more than ever, factors internal to Nigeria seem to be the 
determinants of the relationship with the U.S. America's renewed interest 
in Nigeria as a partner in trade and investment, the abiding U.S. interest 
in oil, and the emphasis in U.S. policy on economic reform in African 
countr ies all combine to make Nigeria ' s economic situation an important 
factor in the relationship. American emphasis on democratization comes 
at a time when Nigeria ' s progress towards democracy is just about as slow 
as it has ever been . U.S.-Nigeria relations do not seem likely to improve 
in the near future unless the downward spiral of Nigeria ' s economy and 
political system is reversed . If U.S .-Nigeria relations do not improve 
soon, it may no longer be possible to characterize the relationship as 
altern ating between highs and lows, but rather as being in a state of 
permanent decline . 
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